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DECRYPTING THE DMCA: FAIR USE AS A DEFENSE
TO THE DISTRIBUTION OF DeCSS
Ryan L. Van Den Elzen*
INTRODUCTION
The movie industry has long been concerned with protecting the
copyrights of its productions. With the advent of movies in digital for-
mat, currently distributed on DVDs, the ability of pirates to make
high-quality illegal copies is a major concern of the movie industry.'
The industry has responded by adopting a uniform encryption tech-
nology known as CSS to prevent the unauthorized copying of DVDs.2
When a group of individuals created a software program, known as
DeCSS, to circumvent CSS and allow DVDs to be copied, the movie
industry sued, alleging violations of the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act (DMCA). 3
In the recent case of Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes,4
several motion picture, studios5 brought suit against the oper-
ators of a web site 6 that was providing a software utility known as
* Candidate forJuris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2002. B.S., University of
Wisconsin, 1999. An earlier version of this Note received First Prize in Notre Dame's
annual Nathan Burkan Memorial Writing Competition. I would like to thank my
family for all their love and support. I would also like to thank Professors Joseph
Bauer and Patricia Bellia of the Notre Dame Law School for their insight and
suggestions regarding this Note. A final note of thanks to all the members of the
Notre Dame Law Review who aided in the publication of this Note.
1 See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 309 (S.D.N.Y.
2000).
2 Seeid.
3 Id. at 303 n.1.
4 111 F. Supp. 2d 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
5 Eight motion picture studios were involved as plaintiffs. Id. at 303.
6 The original defendants in the lawsuit were Shawn Reimerdes, Roman Kazan,
and Eric Corley, all of whom owned or operated websites that were distributing
DeCSS. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 82 F. Supp. 2d 211, 214-15
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (order granting preliminary injunction). Defendants Shawn
Reimerdes and Roman Kazan entered into settlement agreements with the plaintiffs.
Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 312 n.91. The plaintiffs then amended the complaint to
include Eric Corley's company, 2600 Enterprises, Inc. as a defendant. Id. Thus, the
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DeCSS.7 To understand why the plaintiffs sued and why they alleged a
violation of the DMCA, 8 it is important to gain a basic knowledge of
the technology involved in the case.
DVDs are digital disks the same size as CDs. While a typical CD is
capable of storing about 650 MB of data, a DVD is capable of storing
more than 4.7 GB of data.9 In the mid-to-late 1990s, motion picture
studios began to distribute full-length motion pictures in digital for-
mat on DVDs.10 A major concern of the movie studios was that unlike
VHS tapes, the digital information of DVDs can be copied from gener-
ation to generation with no degradation in quality, thus leading to an
increased threat of piracy.11 "Discussions among the studios with the
goal of organizing a unified response to the piracy threat began in
earnest in late 1995 or early 1996."12 In 1996 the studios agreed to use
CSS to protect their copyrighted material in digital format on DVDs.13
CSS, Content Scramble System, "is an encryption-based system
that requires the use of appropriately configured hardware such as a
DVD player or a computer DVD drive to decrypt, unscramble and play
back, but not copy, motion pictures on DVDs." 14 "A CSS-protected
DVD can be decrypted by an appropriate decryption algorithm that
employs a series of keys stored on the DVD and the DVD player."15
CSS is licensed to manufacturers of DVD players and drives, subject to
strict security requirements. 16 "Moreover, manufacturers may not,
consistent with their licenses, make equipment that would supply digi-
tal output that could be used in copying protected DVDs." 17
In September 1999, a group of individuals who met on the In-
ternet "reverse engineered a licensed DVD player and discovered the
remaining defendants in the case were Eric Corley and his company 2600 Enterprises,
Inc., which publishes a computer magazine known as 2600: The Hacker Quarterly and
operates a web site at www.2600.com (2600.com). Id. at 308-09.
7 Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 309.
8 The plaintiffs alleged a violation of § 1201 (a) (2). Id. at 303 n.1; see also
Reimerdes, 82 F. Supp. 2d at 215.
9 Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 307.
10 Id. at 309. While the movie companies began experimenting with DVDs in the
mid-1990s, the first movies in DVD format were released on the consumer market in
1997. Id. at 310.
11 See id. at 309.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id. at 308.
15 Id. at 310.
16 See id.
17 Id.
[VOL. 77:2
DECRYPTING THE DMCA
CSS encryption algorithm and keys."' 8 With this information, the
group created DeCSS, a computer program capable of decrypting
DVDs, thus allowing the playback on non-licensed devices and the
copying of files from DVDs to computer hard drives.' 9 Once on the
hard drive, the motion picture files can be copied and transmitted just
like any other file. 20 The movie industry's main concern is that pi-
rated copies of their movies will be transmitted over the Internet.21
The plaintiff movie studios in Reimerdes became aware of the exis-
tence of DeCSS in October 1999 and filed suit in January 2000 after
the defendants failed to comply with a cease-and-desist letter sent out
by the movie industry demanding that the defendants remove the
DeCSS code from their websites.22 The plaintiffs alleged a violation of
§ 1201 (a) (2), prohibiting the distribution of a technology used to cir-
cumvent a technological measure used to prevent access to a pro-
tected work.23
The Reimerdes court made several findings relevant to this Note.
First, the court found that the defendants violated § 1201 (a) (2) in
posting DeCSS on their web site.24 The court further held that none
of the statutory exceptions in the DMCA applied to the defendants'
conduct.25 In addition, the court held that fair use was not a defense
to the distribution of DeCSS, stating that the only fair uses allowed
were those included in the statutory exceptions.2 6
With the Reimerdes case as a narrative backdrop, it is now neces-
sary to develop an understanding of the DMCA. "The 'Digital Millen-
nium Copyright Act of 1998' is designed to facilitate the robust
development and world-wide expansion of electronic commerce, com-
munications, research, development, and education in the digital
age."27 As part of the DMCA, three provisions important to this Note
18 Id. at 311.
19 See id.
20 See id. at 313.
21 See id. at 314. While the large amount of data stored on a DVD would take a
long time to transfer over the Internet, there is a compression program, DivX, that
allows the DVD files to be compressed into a more manageable size and thus facili-
tates easier transfer. See id. at 313. It is also a concern of the motion picture studios
that compressed copies of the DVDs would be copied onto CDs and distributed. Id. at
314.
22 See id. at 312.
23 See id. at 303 n.1; see also Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 82 F. Supp.
2d 211, 215 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (order granting preliminary injunction).
24 See Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. at 317-19.
25 See id. at 319-21.
26 See id. at 321-24.
27 See S. REP. No. 105-190, at 1-2 (1998).
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were added to Title 17 of the United States Code.28 First,
§ 1201(a)(1) prohibits the circumvention of technological measures
that effectively control access to a protected work (circumvention of
access-control measure). 29 Second, § 1201(a) (2) further prohibits
the manufacture of or trafficking in any technology that circumvents
an effective technological measure used to restrict access to a pro-
tected work (trafficking in technology to circumvent an access-control
measure),30 Finally, § 1201(b) prohibits the manufacture of or traf-
ficking in any technology that circumvents an effective technological
measure used to prevent copying of a protected work (trafficking in
technology to circumvent a copy-control measure).31 The legislative
history explains the difference in these two provisions:
Although sections 1201 (a) (2) and 1201(b) of the bill are worded
similarly and employ similar tests, they are designed to protect two
distinct rights and to target two distinct classes of devices. Sub-sec-
tion 1201 (a) (2) is designed to protect access to a copyrighted work.
Section 1201(b) is designed to protect the traditional copyright
rights .... 32
As noted above, DeCSS serves two functions: it allows a user to
play a DVD on a non-licensed player, and it permits copying of DVDs.
These two functions potentially implicate two different provisions of
the DMCA: § 1201 (a) (2)'s prohibition on trafficking in a technology
to circumvent access-controls, and § 1201 (b)'s prohibition on traffick-
ing in technology to circumvent copy-controls. In Reimerdes, however,
the court seemed to combine the two functions of DeCSS, and to as-
sume that because DeCSS permits unauthorized copying of DVDs, it
also permits unauthorized access to DVDs. Part I of this Note will ex-
amine the applicability of § 1201 (a) (2) to the distribution of DeCSS.
This Note will argue that to the extent that DeCSS allows playback of
DVDs on non-licensed players, it does not violate § 1201 (a) (2). Part
II will then look at § 1201 (b), the provision prohibiting the trafficking
of any technology for circumventing an effective technological mea-
28 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)-(b) (Supp. V 1999).
29 See id. § 1201(a)(1)(A).
30 See id. § 1201 (a) (2). The Code specifically prohibits the trafficking of any tech-
nology that is primarily designed for, has only limited commercially significant pur-
poses other than, or is marketed as a technology for circumventing an effective access-
control measure. Id.
31 See id. § 1201(b) (1). The Code specifically prohibits the trafficking of any
technology that is primarily designed for, has only limited commercially significant
purposes other than, or is marketed as a technology for circumventing an effective
copy-control measure. Id.
32 S. RP. No. 105-190, at 12.
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sure to protect traditional copyrights.33 This Note will analyze the ap-
plicability of § 1201 (b) to the distribution of DeCSS. In doing so, this
Note will examine the implications of the fair use doctrine on the
attempted prohibition on the distribution of DeCSS. In brief, the fair
use doctrine allows a person, in some circumstances, to lawfully copy a
copyrighted work without the permission of the copyright owner.
34
This Note will argue that there are constitutional dimensions to the
fair use doctrine that may prevent Congress from enacting a law as
broad as the DMCA.
I. THE APPLICABILIY OF § 1201(a) TO THE DISTIUTION OF DeCSS
As stated above, DeCSS does not fall under the scope of § 1201
(a) (2) of the DMCA. Section 1201(a) (2) states that "[n] o person
shall manufacture, import, offer to the public, provide, or otherwise
traffic in any technology, product, service, device, component, or part
thereof,"35 that is primarily designed for,3 6 has only limited purposes
other than,3 7 or is marketed for use in38 "circumventing a technologi-
cal measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under
[Tide 17]."39 The court in Reimerdes seems to have taken for granted
that § 1201 (a) (2) applies to DeCSS. The only place the Reimerdes
court acknowledges that there is an argument that DeCSS might not
provide unlawful access is in a footnote.40
33 17 U.S.C. § 1201(b) (Supp. V 1999).
34 The fair use doctrine is currently codified at 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
35 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (a) (2).
36 Id. § 1201 (a) (2) (A).
37 Id. § 1201 (a) (2) (B).
38 Id. § 1201(a) (2) (C).
39 Id. § 1201 (a) (2). The full text of § 1201 (a) (2) reads:
No person shall manufacture, import, offer to the public, provide, or other-
wise traffic in any technology, product, service, device, component, or part
thereof, that-
(A) is primarily designed or produced for the purpose of circumventing
a technological measure that effectively controls access to a work protected
under this tide;
(B) has only limited commercially significant purpose or use other than
to circumvent a technological measure that effectively controls access to a
work protected under this title; or
(C) is marketed by that person or another acting in concert with that
person with that person's knowledge for use in circumventing a technologi-
cal measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under this
title.
Id.
40 See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 317 n.137
(S.D.N.Y. 2000). While the argument made in the footnote is different from that
2002]
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The statute states that "a technological measure 'effectively con-
trols access to a work' if the measure, in the ordinary course of its
operation, requires the application of information, or a process or a
treatment, with the authority of the copyright owner, to gain access to
the work. '41 The word "access" is not defined in the statute, 42 and it is
not self-evident that DeCSS circumvents an access-control measure as
intended by the statute. There are two ways of thinking about what it
means to gain "access" to a work. First, "access" may be obtained
when a person lawfully acquires a work. Second, a person who law-
fully acquires a work may nevertheless not obtain "access" to the work
without following the procedure prescribed by the copyright holder.
Which of these approaches is correct has important implications in
analyzing whether trafficking in DeCSS violates § 1201 (a) (2). If the
first approach is applied, trafficking in DeCSS probably does not vio-
late § 1201 (a) (2), but if the second approach is used, trafficking in
DeCSS most likely does violate § 1201 (a) (2). As discussed below, the
existing case law on § 1201 (a) (2) does not compel the use of the sec-
made in this Note, the Reimerdes court dismissed the former as "pure sophistry." Id.
The full text of the footnote reads:
Decryption or avoidance of an access-control measure is not "circum-
vention" within the meaning of the statute unless it occurs "without the
authority of the copyright owner." 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (a) (3) (A). Defend-
ants posit that purchasers of a DVD acquire the right "to perform all
acts with it that are not exclusively granted to the copyright holder."
Based on this premise, they argue that DeCSS does not circumvent CSS
within the meaning of the statute because the Copyright Act does not
grant the copyright holder the right to prohibit purchasers from
decrypting. As the copyright holder has no statutory right to prohibit
decryption, the argument goes, decryption cannot be understood as un-
lawful circumvention. Def. Post-Trial Mem. 10-13. The argument is pure
sophistry. The DMCA proscribes trafficking in technology that decrypts
or avoids an access-control measure without the copyright holder con-
senting to the decryption or avoidance.
SeeJUDICIARY COMM. REP. at 17-18 (fair use applies "where the access is au-
thorized"). Defendants' argument seems to be a corruption of the first sale
doctrine, which holds that the copyright holder, notwithstanding the exclu-
sive distribution right conferred by § 106(3) of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C.
§ 106(3), is deemed by its "first sale" of a copy of the copyrighted work to
have consented to subsequent sale of the copy.
Id. The Reimerdes court did not correctly interpret the legislative history. See infra
notes 56-67 and accompanying text.
41 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (a) (3) (B).
42 Id. Nowhere is access defined. See id.
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ond approach.43 Furthermore, the legislative history of § 1201 (a) (2)
supports the first approach.44
There are a few cases interpreting § 1201 (a) of the DMCA. In
CSC Holdings, Inc. v. Greenleaf Electronics, Inc., the defendant was pro-
ducing cable boxes that allowed users to view premium channels
(such as HBO and Showtime) and pay-per-view .channels without pay-
ing for the access.45 The court concluded that the unauthorized cable
box allowed a user to obtain unauthorized access, and, therefore, the
sale of the device by the defendant likely violated § 1201(a) (2).46
DeCSS is distinguishable from the cable box in CSC Holdings. An ille-
gal cable box, often referred to as a "black box," allows a user to un-
scramble an encrypted channel that the user has not purchased. 47
DeCSS allows a user to make fair use48 of, or use a non-licensed player
to view, a DVD he or she has already purchased. Thus, it is unclear
whether DeCSS allows unauthorized access or merely allows a user to
make fair use once authorized access has been obtained.49
In another case, Sony Computer Entertainment America, Inc. v.
Gamemasters, the court determined that the distribution of a device,
the Game Enhancer, that allowed videogame players to access games
not from the same geographic region as the videogame machine
probably violated § 1201 (a) (2) of the DMCA.50 Sony markets its Play-
Station games according to geographic region. 51 Thus, a game sold in
Japan is not useable on a machine sold in the United States.52 While
the distribution of the Game Enhancer is more similar to DeCSS, it is
43 See infra notes 45-55 and accompanying text.
44 See infra notes 56-67 and accompanying text.
45 No. 99C7249, 2000 WL 715601, at *3 (N.D. Ill. June 2, 2000) (order granting
preliminary injunction).
46 See id. at *6.
47 See id. at *5.
48 Fair use is defined in § 107 of the Copyright Act. Fair use allows a person, in
limited circumstances, to copy or otherwise use a copyrighted work without the per-
mission of the copyright owner. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994); see also infranotes 125-29
and accompanying text. Applying § 107, it is probably fair use for a film student to
copy excerpts from various movies in order to study the directorial techniques. The
use by the student is for educational purposes falling within one of the examples
listed in § 107. See 17 U.S.C. § 107. Furthermore, the film student is not copying the
movies for profit, but is only using a small portion of the copyrighted work, and will
probably have no effect on the market for the protected work. See id.
49 See infra note 60 and accompanying text.
50 87 F. Supp. 2d 976, 987-88 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (order granting preliminary in-
junction). Presumably Sony was concerned that users in America would be allowed to
play games that Sony only intended for use in Europe or Japan. See id. at 986.
51 See id. at 981.
52 See id.
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still distinguishable. A game marketed and sold in Japan is not in-
tended for use in the United States. Therefore, the Game Enhancer
allows users in the United States to obtain access to games only in-
tended for use in other countries. While it is possible that DeCSS can
be used to view DVDs marketed for use in other regions, DeCSS also
allows users in the United States to potentially make fair use of movies
intended for distribution in the United States, which the user has law-
fully acquired.
In Realnetworks, Inc. v. Streambox, Inc., the court found that a de-
vice known as the Streambox VCR likely violates § 1201 (a) (2) of the
DMCA. 53 The Streambox VCR allows users to copy onto their com-
puter hard drives music and video files that were intended only for
streaming (playing) on the Internet and were formatted specifically to
prevent copying.54 The court found that "[t]o guard against the un-
authorized copying and redistribution of their content, many copy-
right owners do not make their content available for downloading,
and instead distribute the content using streaming technology in a
manner that does not permit downloading."55 Similar to the owners
of the underlying copyrights in DVDs, the owners of the streamed
copyrighted material intended to prevent their material from being
copied and pirated. However, unlike DVDs, which consumers
purchase and maintain a permanent copy of, streamed material is in-
tended for only one use; if a user wants to view or listen to the mate-
rial again, it must be re-streamed.
All the cases discussed above deal with technologies that allow a
user to view or use content the user has not lawfully acquired. How-
eyer, those cases offer no guidance for interpreting § 1201 (a) (2) with
respect to content a user has lawfully acquired. In other words, the
cases discussed above do not preclude the argument that once a user
has lawfully obtained a DVD, the person has "access" to the DVD, and
thus, DeCSS is not a technology used to circumvent access-control
measures. Indeed, the legislative history of the DMCA tends to sup-
port this view.
In its report accompanying the DMCA, the House Judiciary Com-
mittee stated that the "act of circumventing a technological protection
measure put in place by a copyright owner to control access to a copy-
righted work is the electronic equivalent of breaking into a locked
53 No. 2:99CV02070, 2000 WL 127311, at *8 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 18, 2000) (order
granting preliminary injunction).
54 See id. at *5.
55 Id. at *2.
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room in order to obtain a copy of a book."56 This analogy does not
apply to DeCSS. In order to use DeCSS to decrypt a DVD one must
first have the DVD. 57 Once a person purchases a DVD that person
arguably has obtained authorized access to the motion picture. To say
that a person cannot use DeCSS to view the DVD is like selling a book
that only comes with a locking mechanism on the binding preventing
the purchaser from reading the book and saying that the only accept-
able means of unlocking the book is a key specifically licensed by the
publisher. It is hard to imagine anyone arguing that it would violate a
right of the copyright owner in the book to have a locksmith make a
key to unlock the book rather than use a key licensed by the pub-
lisher. DeCSS is simply the locksmith that provides an alternative way
of viewing information that the consumer has already paid for and
thus obtained authorized access.
Moreover, a DVD player or computer DVD drive is required to
read the information on the DVD.58 Surely some, probably a commer-
cially significant amount, of the users of DeCSS also own a licensed
DVD player (thus, continuing with the locked book analogy, they have
the key the movie industry tells them they must use).59 While the
above paragraph argues that ownership of a DVD is enough for au-
thorized access, an even stronger argument can be made that owner-
ship of both the DVD and a licensed DVD drive provides the user
authorized access. In fact, it is not possible for a consumer to have
any more authorization than the legal copy of the DVD and the li-
censed DVD drive.
A passage from the House Judiciary Committee Report on the
DMCA indicates that § 1201 (a) was not intended to apply to situations
like DVD owners using DeCSS:
Paragraph (a) (1) does not apply to the subsequent actions of a per-
son once he or she has obtained authorized access to a copy of a
work protected under Tide 17, even if such actions involve circumven-
tion of additionalforms of technological protection measures. In a fact situ-
ation where the access is authorized, the traditional defenses to
copyright infringement, including fair use, would be fully applica-
56 H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 1, at 17 (1998).
57 See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 313
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (explaining how the "plaintiffs' expert decrypted a store-bought copy of
Sleepless in Seattle.") (emphasis added).
58 See id. at 308 (explaining that CSS requires the use of a DVD player or drive).
59 This statement is only an assumption and some research is needed to find out
what percentage of DeCSS users actually have licensed DVD drives. This information
is something that the court in Reimerdes should have required in order to give true
consideration to the idea that there may have been authorized access to the work.
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ble. So, an individual would not be able to circumvent in order to
gain unauthorized access to a work, but would be able to do so in order
to make fair use of a work which he or she has acquired lawfully.60
An owner of a DVD seems to be the type of person the Judiciary Com-
mittee was referring to in the above quotation. A person who
purchases a DVD has lawfully acquired a copy of the movie on that disc
and thus has authorized access to the movie. This purchaser who has
lawfully acquired the movie may then legally circumvent additional forms
of technological protections.
A close reading of the legislative history demonstrates the in-
tended scope of the DMCA's access-control measures. The House Ju-
diciary Committee stated that "Uj]ust as Congress acted in the areas of
cable television and satellite transmissions to prevent unauthorized in-
terception and descrambling of signals, it is now necessary to address
the on-line environment."6 1 The comparison to cable television and
satellite transmission signals, as well as the reference to the on-line en-
vironment, implies that the access-control provisions were intended to
prevent a person from illegally intercepting things such as an en-
crypted on-line pay-per-view type transmission. 62 The House Judiciary
Committee went on to say that § 1201 (a) "is drafted carefully to target
'black boxes .... '63 Again, the reference to black boxes implies the
interception of a signal, not the viewing of a movie one has already
bought. The House Commerce Committee also weighed in with its
opinion stating that the DMCA "defines whether consumers and busi-
nesses may engage in certain conduct, or use certain devices, in the
course of transacting electronic commerce. Indeed, many of these
rules may determine the extent to which electronic commerce realizes
its potential."64 The reference to electronic commerce again strongly
60 H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 1, at 18 (emphasis added). The Senate Judiciary
Committee had a similar sentiment: "This paragraph does not apply to subsequent
actions of a person once he or she has obtained authorized access to a copy of a work
protected under title 17, even if such actions involve circumvention of other types of
technological protection measures." S. REP. No. 105-190, at 28 (1998).
61 H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 1, at 10.
62 The Reimerdes court states that DeCSS "threatens also to impede new, poten-
tially lucrative initiatives for the distribution of motion pictures in digital form, such
as video-on-demand via the Internet." 111 F. Supp. 2d at 315. The court was wrong
on this point. DeCSS merely allows a user greater access to a movie he already has
authorized access to; and thus, does not fall within the provisions of § 1201(a), a
technology that would allow a user to intercept and view an encrypted video-on-de-
mand presentation over the Internet is precisely the unauthorized access with which
the DMCA is concerned.
63 H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 1, at 18.
64 Id. pt. 2, at 22 (1998).
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implies that the DMCA's access-control provisions were intended to
prevent interception of on-line transmissions of copyrighted works
and not to prevent access to a work a consumer has already
purchased.
Only once in the legislative history is there a hint that the DMCA
may be intended to protect consumer items such as DVDs. The House
Commerce Committee, in discussing concerns that strict access-con-
trol measures might erode fair use, made a reference to videocassettes
and CD-ROMs. 65 The Commerce Committee mentioned these con-
sumer goods as examples of media that already implement technolog-
ical protection measures and went on to express concern that new
technological measures might "diminish [ ] the ability of individuals to
use these works in ways that are otherwise lawful." 66 While this part of
the legislative history could be interpreted as bringing DVDs within
the scope of § 1201 (a), it is more likely just the Commerce Committee
expressing concern regarding fair use as new technological measures
are implemented. Neither the Senate nor the House Judiciary Com-
mittees gave any mention to videocassettes or CD-ROMs. 67
Even if the DMCA was intended to prohibit owners of DVDs from
accessing the information on the discs on unlicensed players or drives,
a person with both the DVD and a licensed drive surely has authorized
access to the information. In fact, there is no further access "key"
available to the consumer. "A CSS-protected DVD can be decrypted
by an appropriate decryption algorithm that employs a series of keys
stored on the DVD and the DVD player. In consequence, only players
and drives containing the appropriate keys are able to decrypt DVD
files and thereby play movies stored on DVDs." 68 If a consumer has
both the DVD and a licensed DVD drive, he or she must have author-
ized access to the work as there is no further level of authorization
available. Once authorized access is obtained, the consumer can cir-
cumvent "in order to make fair use of a work which he or she has
acquired lawfully." 69 DeCSS merely provides a means to legally cir-
cumvent a technological measure after the work has been lawfully
acquired.
65 See id. at 37.
66 Id.
67 See generally S. REP. No. 105-190 (1998); H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 1. Nowhere
in the discussion of § 1201 (a) is there a discussion of videocassettes or CD-ROMs in
either of these reports. See S. REP. No. 105-190; H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 1.
68 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 310 (S.D.N.Y.
2000).
69 H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 1, at 18.
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If one believes that both a DVD and a licensed player, notjust the
DVD, are required for authorized access, the question then becomes:
Is there a commercially significant number of DeCSS users who do
have authorized access to the work?70
For a technology.., to be prohibited under this subsection, one of
three conditions must be met. [The technology] must:
(1) be primarily designed or produced for the purpose of
circumventing;
(2) have only a limited commercially significant purpose or use
other than to circumvent; or
(3) be marketed... for use in circumventing a technological pro-
tection measure that effectively controls access to a work pro-
tected under Title 17.7 1
None of these conditions capture DeCSS. DeCSS is not primarily de-
signed for circumventing an access-control measure,72 but instead al-
lows a user to circumvent other technological measures, such as copy-
control measures, once access is lawfully gained. Furthermore, DeCSS
is not marketed as a means to circumvent access-control measures. 73
The remaining question is whether or not there is a commercially sig-
nificant use for DeCSS (such as making fair use of a lawfully acquired
work) other than to circumvent access-control measures.74 It is un-
clear if there has been any research to determine the number of
DeCSS users who have licensed DVD drives. This data would be
needed in order to authoritatively say that the access-control provi-
sions of the DMCA do not bar the distribution of DeCSS. The remain-
ing parts of this Note will assume that either ownership of a DVD itself
is enough for authorized access or that a commercially significant
number of DeCSS users also use licensed DVD drives.
Now that it is evident that the access-control provisions in
§ 1201 (a) (1) of the DMCA were not intended to apply to situations
where consumers had already purchased a copy of a movie, 75 it follows
that the anti-trafficking provisions of § 1201 (a) (2) are likewise inappli-
cable. If DeCSS does not allow unauthorized access to a copyrighted
work then it does not fit within § 1201 (a) (2) prohibiting the traffick-
70 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2)(B) (Supp. V 1999).
71 H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 1, at 18.
72 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (a) (2) (A).
73 See id. § 1201 (a) (2) (C). One of the creators of DeCSS stated that the program
was intended to allow a user to view a DVD using a Linux operating system. See
Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 311. DeCSS can also be lawfully marketed as a tool to
make fair use of DVDs.
74 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (a) (2) (B).
75 See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
[VOL. 77:2
DECRYPTING THE DMCA
ing of devices designed for "circumventing a technological measure
that effectively controls access to a work protected under [Title 17].1176
The real concern of the movie industry regarding DVDs is not the
"unauthorized" access of material on DVDs using an unlicensed DVD
drive but rather possibilities of copyright infringement, especially the
unauthorized copying of DVDs, 7 7 using an unlicensed DVD drive.
This concern is made evident by the fact that CSS was looked at as a
"unified response to the piracy threat" posed by the reproduction ca-
pabilities of digital media.78 Another fact demonstrating that in-
fringement is the main concern of the movie industry is that
"manufacturers may not, consistent with their licenses, make equip-
ment that would supply digital output that could be used in copying
protected DVDs."79 Thus while CSS does technically restrict access to
a work, the true purpose of CSS is to protect the rights of the copy-
right owner. As explained above, the consumer obtains authorized
access when he or she purchases the DVD (or places a lawfully ac-
quired DVD in a licensed DVD drive). Therefore, what CSS actually
does, as is consistent with the purpose of the technology, is protect the
traditional rights of the copyright owner. Because CSS is truly a copy-
control measure, not an access-control measure, § 1201 (b) should be
applied to the distribution of DeCSS.80
II. THE IMPLICATIONS OF FAIR USE ON THE ANTI-TRAFFICKING
PROVISION OF § 1201(b)
Section 1201(b) of the DMCA prohibits the trafficking of a tech-
nology that is primarily designed for, has limited commercially signifi-
cant purposes other than, or is marketed for use in circumventing a
technological control measure that effectively protects a right of a
copyright holder.8' Unlike § 1201 (a), this section does not contain a
provision prohibiting circumvention but merely prohibits the distribu-
tion of a technology for circumvention. As the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee explained, "copyright law has long forbidden copyright
infringements, so no new prohibition was necessary. The device limi-
76 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (a) (2).
77 Unauthorized copying is a violation of the copyright owner's exclusive rights.
17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (1994).
78 Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 309.
79 Id. at 310.
80 The remainder of this Note will focus its arguments towards § 1201(b). How-
ever, arguments very similar to those made in this Note can be made regarding the
anti-trafficking provision of § 1201 (a) (2).
81 17 U.S.C. § 1201(b)(1).
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tation in 1201(b) enforces the longstanding prohibitions on
infringements., 82
Assuming that CSS is a technology that effectively protects a work
from copyright infringement, 83 the question then arises as to whether
or not the anti-trafficking provisions are consistent with the doctrine
of fair use.
The notion of "fair use" is codified in § 107 of the Copyright
Act.8 4 The fair use defense applies, "[n] otwithstanding the provisions
of sections 106 and 106A,"85 which grant the owner of a copyright
certain exclusive rights.86 Thus, a person can make "fair use" of a
copyrighted work without the consent of the owner and not be liable
for infringement. The statute states that "purposes such as criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for
classroom use), scholarship, or research" fall within the scope of the
fair use defense.87 The statute goes on to list four nonexclusive 88 fac-
tors to be considered in determining whether a particular use is fair.
These factors include: (1) the purpose of the use, including whether it
is commercial or educational; (2) the nature of the protected work;
(3) the amount used in proportion to the copyrighted work as a
whole; and (4) the effect of the use on the market value of the pro-
tected work. 89 Thus, the fair use doctrine "permits courts to avoid
rigid application of the copyright statute when, on occasion, it would
82 S. REP. No. 105-190, at 12 (1998).
83 An argument can be made that CSS does nothing to prevent illegal copying.
The court in Reimerdes stated that as a condition of their license to use CSS, manufac-
turers of DVD players and drives are not allowed to make equipment that would allow
digital output for the copying of DVDs. 111 F. Supp. 2d at 310. This assetion implies
that CSS does not itself restrict copying, but manufacturers simply are not allowed to
provide the digital output for copying. The Reimerdes defendant's post-trial brief also
hints at this argument, saying that the "plaintiffs' authorized players deliberately do
not" allow any copying even for fair use purposes. Defendant's Post-Trial Memoran-
dum at 2, Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 82 F. Supp. 2d 211 (S.D.N.Y.
2000), available at http://www.2600.com/dvd/docs/2000/0808-briefl.html (last vis-
ited Jan. 25, 2001). If CSS is not a technology that effectively protects the right of a
copyright owner, namely unauthorized copying and distribution, then § 1201 (b) does
not apply, and because, as explained in Part I, supra, § 1201 (a) (2) does not apply, the
DMCA would not be applicable to persons who circumvent CSS.
84 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
85 Id.
86 See id. §§ 106, 106A (1994).
87 Id. § 107.
88 See Harper & Row, Publ'g v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985).
89 17 U.S.C. § 107.
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stifle the very creativity which that law is designed to foster."90 The
fair use doctrine, as codified in the 1976 Copyright Act, was intended
to restate the common-law doctrine that had previously developed,
not to expand, narrow, or change the preexisting doctrine.9'
Congress was concerned with the implications the anti-circum-
vention and anti-trafficking provisions of the DMCA would have on
fair use.92 Congress ultimately included a provision in § 1201 (a) (1) of
the DMCA which requires the Librarian of Congress to determine, in
a rulemaking proceeding, "whether persons who are users of a copy-
righted work are, or are likely to be... adversely affected by the prohi-
bition under [the anti-circumvention provision] in their ability to
make noninfringing uses under this title of a particular class of copy-
righted works." 93 While a lot of lip service was given to preserving fair
use, as codified, the DMCA effectively eliminates the doctrine of fair
use as applied to encrypted works.
A. Congress Has Prohibited the Means for a Person To Make Fair Use of
an Encrypted Work
While § 1201 (a) (1) apparently contains a provision intending to
preserve fair use,94 nothing in the anti-trafficking provisions of
§ 1201 (a) (2) or § 1201 (b) allows a person to provide another with the
means to make fair use. Consistent with the argument above, the re-
mainder of this Note will focus on § 1201 (b), which prohibits the traf-
ficking of a technology to circumvent a copy-control measure;
however, a similar argument can be made regarding § 1201 (a) (2),
which prohibits the trafficking of a technology to circumvent an ac-
cess-control measure.95
Along with the Librarian of Congress provision in
§ 1201 (a) (1) (C) seemingly protecting fair use, there are also specific
exceptions to § 1201 (a) (1) (A) pertaining to fair use that will be dealt
with in order. First, there is an exception for non-profit libraries and
educational institutions, but this exception applies only to the act of
circumvention and specifically states that libraries and educational in-
90 Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990) (quoting Iowa State Univ. Research
Found., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 621 F.2d 57, 60 (2d Cir. 1980)).
91 See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 549.
92 See generally David Nimmer, A Riff on Fair Use in the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 673 (2000) (discussing legislative history and debate on how to
protect fair use while implementing the anti-circumvention provisions).
93 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C) (Supp. V 1999).
94 See id.
95 For an application of this idea to § 1201 (a) (2), see Nimmer, supra note 92, at
727-37.
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stitutions can still be liable for trafficking in a technology to circum-
vent.96 Next, there is a law enforcement exception that allows
trafficking but is strictly limited to law enforcement or government
activities.97 Then, there is a reverse engineering exception that allows
civilians to traffic in a technology to circumvent but "solely for the
purpose of enabling interoperability of an independently created
computer program with other programs. '98 Fourth, there is an en-
cryption research exception that allows a person to circumvent and
traffic in a technology to circumvent access but does not allow a per-
son to traffic in a technology to circumvent a copy-control measure. 99
Next, there is an exception that allows a person to circumvent an ac-
cess-control measure if that measure has the capability of collecting
personally identifiable information of the person accessing the work;
this provision does not allow the trafficking of a technology to circum-
vent.100 Finally, there is an exception for security testing that allows
circumvention and trafficking of a technology to circumvent access-
control measures in order to perform security testing; this exception
Allows Trafficking in a Allows Trafficking in a
Technology to Technology to
Allows Circumvent Circumvent
Circumvention Access-Control Copy-Control
§1201 (a) (1) (C): Yes No No
Librarian of Congress
Determination
§ 1201(d): Yes No No
Library/Educational
Exception
§ 1201 (e): Yes Yes Yes
Law Enforcement
Exception
§ 1201 (f): Yes Yes Yes
Reverse Engineering
Exception
§ 1201 (g): Yes Yes No
Encryption Research
Exception
§ 1201 (i): Yes No No
Personally Identifying
Information Exception
§ 12010): Yes Yes No
Security Testing
Exception
96 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (d) (1), (4).
97 See id. § 1201 (e).
98 Id. § 1201(f) (1), (3).
99 See id. § 1201(g)( 2 ), (4).
100 See id. § 1201(i)(1). Section 1201(h) provides an exception intending to pro-
tect minors on the Internet. See id. § 1201 (h).
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does not apply to trafficking in a technology to circumvent a copy-
control measure.10' The following table summarizes the exceptions
to the anti-circumvention and anti-trafficking provisions.
As the above table illustrates, the only two exceptions that allow
trafficking in a technology to circumvent a copy-control measure are
for law enforcement and reverse engineering purposes. The law en-
forcement exception is very restrictive and applies only to an officer,
agent, or employee of the government acting in the line of duty.10 2
The reverse engineering exception is also strictly limited to apply to a
small subset of society with the ability to engage in reverse engineer-
ing of computer programs. 103 None of the exceptions allow an ordi-
nary citizen, without the knowledge to develop his or her own
circumvention technology, to make fair use, such as excerpting, of an
encrypted DVD.
For a practical example, assume Ben is an aspiring movie director
and film school student who would like to excerpt small scenes from
several of his favorite movies in order to study the cinematography
and direction. 0 4 Ben owns the DVDs and also has a licensed DVD
drive in his computer. However, Ben does not have the technological
savvy to develop a means to circumvent CSS in order to copy the ex-
cerpts to his hard drive. Ben's friend, Jack, is knowledgeable in com-
puters so Ben asks him for help. Jack informs Ben that he can
probably create a program to circumvent CSS but also tells Ben that
there is already a program known as DeCSS that can accomplish the
task. Under § 1201(b) of the DMCA, it is illegal for Jack to create a
program, such-as DeCSS, and distribute it to Ben so that Ben can
make lawful fair use of his DVDs. In fact, it is illegal for anyone to
make DeCSS available to Ben. While Ben has a legal right to make
fair use of his DVDs,10 5 it is impossible for him to do so because it is
illegal for anyone to provide him with the means to do so. 10 6
Like Ben, most individuals are not able to create their own cir-
cumvention programs in order to bypass copy-control measures. Fur-
thermore, it would be illegal for anyone like Jack or anyone who
possesses DeCSS to provide Ben with a means-the primary purpose
of which is to circumvent the copy-control measures-to lawfully use
101 See id. § 1201(j) (2), (4).
102 See id. § 1201 (e).
103 See id. § 1201(f).
104 For an analysis of why this would be considered fair use, see supra note 48.
105 See H.R REP. No. 105-551, pt. 1, at 18 (1998) (stating that an individual can
circumvent "to make fair use of a work which he or she has acquired lawfully").
106 For a similar example and argument regarding the prohibition on trafficking
in a technology to circumvent access, see Nimmer, supra note 92, at 735-36.
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his DVDs. This is simply bad policy. Congress stated that nothing in
the DMCA was intended to "affect rights, remedies, limitations, or de-
fenses to copyright infringement, including fair use."10 7 While the de-
fense of fair use is technically still available (i.e., a person with the
requisite skill needed to circumvent a copy-control measure can do so
once authorized access is achieved and make fair use of the protected
work), the subset of society with such ability is small.
Under pre-DMCA law, as the Court held in Sony Corp. of America v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., it was legal to traffic in technology that facil-
itated infringement so long as there was a substantial noninfringing
use of the technology.1 08 The "primary purpose" test of § 1201(b) 10 9
is not equivalent to Sony's "substantial noninfringing use" test.110 The
Court in Sony stated that a technology that facilitates infringement
"need merely be capable of substantial noninfringing uses" 'l to sur-
vive an attack for contributory infringement, while § 1201(b)'s "pri-
mary purpose" test talks solely of circumvention, not infringement.' 1 2
Therefore, a person is liable under § 1201 (b) for trafficking in a de-
vice primarily designed to circumvent a copy-control measure even if
there is a substantial noninfringing use of the circumvention. As ex-
plained below, Sony's substantial noninfringing use test may be re-
quired by the Constitution, thus invalidating § 1201(b)'s primary
purpose test." 3 Also, anyone attempting to help another circumvent
a copy-control protection is liable under § 1201(b) regardless of
whether or not there was an infringement.
Two members of the House Commerce Committee seemingly un-
derstood the terrible policy implications of the anti-circumvention
and anti-trafficking provisions. 114 In expressing their additional views
on the House Commerce Committee Report, they "remain [ed] troub-
led by the implications of this legislation."' 15 Representatives Scott
Klug and Rick Boucher understood that, as written, the DMCA "fun-
damentally alters the balance that has been carefully struck in 200
years of copyright case law, by making the private incentive of content
107 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (c) (1).
108 See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 456 (1984).
For a more detailed discussion of Sony, see infra notes 145-50 and accompanying text.
109 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (b) (A).
110 See Sony, 464 U.S. at 442.
111 Id.
112 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(b).
113 See infra notes 145-52 and accompanying text.
114 See generally H.R. REP 105-551, pt. 2, at 85-87 (1998) (Representatives Scott
Klug and Rick Boucher expressing concern that the provisions in § 1201 do not ade-
quately protect fair use).
115 Id. at 85.
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owners [the economic incentive of copyright owners] the paramount
consideration-at the expense of research, scholarship, education,
[and] literary or political commentary."'1 6 The Representatives went
on to say that they intended to restore some balance between the in
terests of copyright owners and the rights of the public to use the
works by
legislating an equivalent fair use defense for the new right to con-
trol access. For reasons not clear to us, and despite the WIPO
Treaty language "recognizing the need to maintain a balance be-
tween the rights of authors and larger public interest, particularly
education, research and access to information * * *," our proposal
was met with strenuous objection .... 117
The proposed amendment to create a separate fair use provision for
the ban on circumvention and trafficking failed, as evidenced by its
absence in the codified Act.118
While Representatives Klug and Boucher appeared to be champi-
ons for fair use in the DMCA, when the bill was presented to the full
House for a vote, both representatives affirmatively supported the bill
to which they had previously voiced objection. Before the full House
of Representatives, Congressman Klug stated that the bill was bal-
anced in a "manner that promotes product development and informa-
tion usage, indeed the very 'progress of Science and the useful arts'
set forth in the Constitution.""19 Representative Boucher also ex-
pressed his support for the bill stating, "The Committee on Com-
merce has, in the manner for which it is known, mastered the intricate
details of this complex subject and has produced a balanced result."120
Nowhere else in the copyright law can a person be found liable
absent a direct infringement on someone's part.' 2 ' Thus, the anti-
trafficking provisions not only obliterate the right to fair use, but also
create a new form of liability for third parties. Unlike contributory
116 Id.
117 Id. at 86.
118 See generally 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (Supp. V 1999). There is not a specific fair use
provision pertaining to either the anti-circumvention or anti-trafficking provisions an-
ywhere in the Act. See id.
119 144 CONG. REc. H10,621 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1998) (statement of Rep. Klug).
Unfortunately, contrary to Representative Klug's statement, user rights were not
protected.
120 144 CONG. REc. H7096 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1998) (statement of Rep. Boucher).
121 See Nimmer, supra note 92, at 734.
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW[
infringement1 22 and vicarious liability, 123 which both require direct in-
fringement in order to find a third party liable, the anti-trafficking
provisions can place liability on a person for providing the means for
another to make lawful use of a protected work.
B. Fair Use Is Constitutionally Compelled
The Constitution states that "Congress shall have Power... To
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for lim-
ited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their re-
spective Writings and Discoveries."'124 While this clause grants authors
an exclusive right to their works for a limited time, it does so in order
to promote the arts and science. Thus, any legislation expanding the
scope of copyright must do so in a way that still promotes the arts and
science. As noted above, the anti-trafficking provisions of the DMCA
effectively eliminate the right of fair use and thus do not comport with
the purpose of the Constitution's Copyright Clause.
While fair use was not codified until the Copyright Act of 1976,
the principle existed at common law for much longer. As far back as
1841,125 courts recognized that "a fair and bona fide abridgment of an
original work, is not piracy of the copyright of the author."1 26 While
§ 107 of the Copyright Act basically codified the common-law doctrine
of fair use,127 it is important to understand why fair use developed at
common law.
Fair use developed in order to effectuate the intent of the Copy-
right Clause:
Although the Copyright Law makes no provision for "fair use" of
another's work, the author's consent to a reasonable use of his copy-
righted works has always been implied by the courts as a necessary
incident of the constitutional policy of promoting the progress of sci-
ence and useful arts, since a prohibition of such use would inhibit
subsequent writers from attempting to improve upon prior works
122 See Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1996)
(stating that both knowledge of the infringing activity and material contribution are
required to find contributory infringement).
123 See id. at 262 (stating that the elements for vicarious liability are a right to
control and direct financial benefit from the infringing activity).
124 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
125 See Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)
("The earliest discussion of the principle was in 1841 by Mr. Justice Story .....
126 Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 345 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901).
127 See Harper & Row, Publ'g v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 549 (1985).
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and thus destroy all incentive to engage in literary activity and frus-
trate the very ends sought to be attained.
128
The Supreme Court favorably quoted this passage, giving it much
credibility.' 29 Several other cases interpreting the common-law fair
use doctrine have recognized the constitutional foundations of fair
use.
In Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis Associates, the court addressed the is-
sue of whether it was fair use for an author to use copies of pictures
owned by Time.i3 0 The pictures were frames from Abraham Za-
pruder's home video of the assassination of John F. Kennedy.13 1 Za-
pruder had sold all the rights in his film to Time.'3 2 The defendants
in the case wanted to use some frames of the film in a book discussing
the assassination but were denied permission and decided to copy the
frames anyway.' 3 3 The court determined that it was fair use for the
defendants to use the pictures, and thus, they were not liable for in-
fringement. 3 4 The court went on to say, "if there is no action for
statutory copyright infringement because the copying by defendants is
found a fair use, then New York could not constitutionally make such
copying an act of unfair competition." 35 This reasoning was based on
an earlier Supreme Court decision, Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., in
which the Court held that a state could not enact unfair competition
laws granting protection to a lamp that was not subject to patent pro-
tection.' 36 The Court in Sears reasoned:
To allow a State by use of its law of unfair competition to prevent
the copying of an article which represents too slight an advance to
be patented would be to permit the State to block off from the pub-
lic something which federal law has said belongs to the public.
13 7
Thus, in both Sears and Time, the Supreme Court and the district
court reasoned that the Supremacy Clause prohibits states from grant-
ing protection to works that federal law says should be available to the
public to promote the useful arts and science. While it could be ar-
gued that Sears and Time deal with preemption law and thus do not
128 HoRAcE G. BALL, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY 260 (1944)
(emphasis added).
129 See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 549.
130 293 F. Supp. at 144-46.
131 See id. at 131.
132 See id. at 133-34.
133 See id. at 138.
134 See id. at 146.
135 Id. (emphasis added).
136 376 U.S. 225, 231-32 (1964).
137 Id.
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apply to the federal government, the Supreme Court's and district
court's references to the Constitution and to fair use demonstrate that
even in the absence of preemption law, the states would not be able to
enact laws that do not comport with fair use. In Time, the court ex-
plicitly said that the Constitution prohibited a state from usurping fair
use.138 This reasoning implies the constitutional basis of the fair use
doctrine, and it follows that the federal government should not be
allowed to usurp fair use.
Another case interpreting the common-law doctrine of fair use
again describes the constitutional basis of the fair use doctrine. In
Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., the court determined
that Random House's use of information from Rosemont's articles on
Howard Hughes was fair use.139 In discussing fair use, the court
stated:
The fundamental justification for the privilege lies in the constitu-
tional purpose in granting copyright protection in the first instance,
to wit, "To Promote the Progress of Science and the Useful Arts."
To serve that purpose, "courts in passing upon particular claims of
infringement must occasionally subordinate the copyright holder's
interest in a maximum financial return to the greater public interest
in the development of art, science and industry."140
While information is not itself subject to copyright,14' the above quo-
tation makes it clear that the court was focusing on fair use rather
than the non-copyrightable nature of factual information. The above
statement again demonstrates that the Constitution requires fair use
in order to promote the useful arts and science. Without fair use,
subsequent authors and members of the public would not be able to
further develop the ideas and learn from the techniques used in previ-
ous works. Applied to DVDs, without fair use, Ben from the example
above would not be able to create the compilation of snippets to study
the directorial techniques, and, thus, the constitutional purpose of
promoting the useful arts and science is subverted.
Along with the cases that demonstrate the constitutional basis for
the common-law fair use doctrine, cases decided after fair use was
codified continue to recognize the constitutional roots of the doc-
trine. "From the infancy of copyright protection, some opportunity
for fair use of copyrighted materials has been thought necessary to
fulfill copyright's very purpose, 'lIt] o promote the Progress of Science
138 Time, 293 F. Supp. at 146.
139 366 F.2d 303, 306 (2d Cir. 1966).
140 Id. at 307 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
141 See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 347 (1991).
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and useful Arts . ,.'142 Likewise, the Court also has stated that fair
use allows courts leeway when a strict reading of the copyright law
would hinder the creativity the copyright clause of the Constitution
intends to promote.' 43 "Fair use allows a court to resolve tensions be-
tween the ends of copyright law, public enjoyment of creative works,
and the means chosen under copyright law, the conferral of economic
benefits upon creators of original works."' 44
A situation similar to that of DeCSS was addressed by the Su-
preme Court in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.145 In
Sony, the Court was asked to determine if Sony's sale of video-copying
equipment 146 violated any rights of copyright owners. 147 In determin-
ing whether a prohibition on VCRs would violate fair use principles,
the Court stated that the "question is thus whether the Betamax is
capable of commercially significant noninfringing uses," and went on
to say that, "one potential use of the Betamax plainly satisfies this stan-
dard, however it is understood: private, noncommercial time-shifting
in the home."'1 48 The court thus determined that time-shifting was a
commercially significant noninfringing (fair) use and therefore was
constitutionally protected. In talking about the Constitution's Copy-
right Clause, the Court stated:
The monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are neither
unlimited nor primarily designed to provide a special private bene-
fit. Rather, the limited grant is a means by which an important pub-
lic purpose may be achieved. It is intended to motivate the creative
activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a special re-
ward, and to allow the public access to the products of their genius
after the limited period of exclusive control has expired.149
The Court went on to say that "the sale of copying equipment, like the
sale of other articles of commerce, does not constitute contributory
infringement if the product is widely used for legitimate, unobjection-
able purposes. Indeed, it need merely be capable of substantial noninfring-
ing uses."' 50 Thus, the Court reasoned that the constitutional balance
142 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575 (1994) (quoting U.S.
CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8).
143 See Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990).
144 Pac. & S. Co. v. Duncan, 744 F.2d 1490, 1495 (11th Cir. 1984).
145 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
146 In this case, the video-copying machine was known as the Betamax. Id. at 422.
The Betamax is vefy similar to.a VHS videocassette recorder.
147 Id. at 420.
148 Id. at 442.
149 Id. at 429.
150 Id. at 442 (emphasis added).
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required between economic incentive to create works and public ac-
cess to works to motivate creativity forbids a ban on a machine that is
capable of allowing noninfringing fair use.
Like the Betamax in Sony, DeCSS is a technology that is capable
of allowing users to make substantial noninfringing uses of protected
works. The court in Reimerdes stated that "Sony involved a construc-
tion of the Copyright Act that has been overruled by the later enact-
ment of the DMCA to the extent of any inconsistency between Sony
and the new statute."1 51 Since Sony relied on constitutional principles,
Congress cannot simply overrule the Sony Court with the enactment
of the DMCA. The enactment of the anti-trafficking provisions of the
DMCA cannot change the underlying principle of Sony that the Con-
stitution requires a balance between the economic interests of authors
and the public's right to use the works in order to foster creativity.
While fair use is an equitable doctrine and the Constitution does not
say where the line must be drawn in balancing the economic interests
of copyright owners and the public's desire to foster creativity, as ex-
plained above, the DMCA effectively eliminates the fair use required
to foster creativity and must run afoul of the Constitution's require-
ments. The anti-trafficking provisions, which effectively eliminate the
right to fair use, do not comport with the requirements of the Consti-
tution made clear in Sony.
Many cases after the Sony decision have attempted to limit the
Court's holding to staple articles of commerce. "Arguably, the Sony
doctrine only applies to 'staple articles or commodities of commerce,'
such as VCR's, photocopiers, and blank, standard-length cassette
tapes."1 52 Even if the limitation of the Sony doctrine to staple articles
of commerce is valid, DeCSS fits within the limitation. DeCSS, like
other computer programs, is a consumer good with legitimate legal
functions and is thus a staple article of commerce. The Betamax in
Sony and modern VCRs are machines capable of copying protected
works in and of themselves. DeCSS is a software utility that allows an-
other machine, a computer, to copy protected works. The fact that
DeCSS, a computer program and consumer good, must be used in
conjunction with another staple article of commerce should not pre-
clude it from being an article of commerce itself. Likewise, the fact
that DeCSS is distributed for free over the Internet should not distin-
guish it from other computer programs that are sold in stores. DeCSS
is a staple article of commerce that is capable of substantial nonin-
151 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 323 (S.D.N.Y.
2000).
152 A & M Records, Inc. v. Abdallah, 948 F. Supp. 1449, 1456 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
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fringing uses and therefore is constitutionally protected for the pro-
motion of useful arts and science.
While the regulatory provisions of § 1201(a) of the DMCA may
preserve fair use and insulate the anti-circumvention provision from a
constitutional attack, a strict reading of the anti-trafficking provisions
of the DMCA does not comport with the intent of copyright law as
expressed in the Constitution. Rather than promote the useful arts
and science, the anti-trafficking provisions radically shift the balance
towards protecting the economic interests of copyright owners at the
expense of society as future creativity is stifled. This shifting balance
may so frustrate the purpose of the Constitution that courts will de-
clare the DMCA unconstitutional. This constitutional problem can be
avoided if a fair use defense is added to the anti-trafficking provisions.
III. CONGRESS DOES NOT HAVE THE POWER To ENACT THE ANTI-
TRAIFICING PROVISIONS UNDER OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL GRANTS
While the Copyright Clause does not grant Congress the power to
enact the anti-trafficking provisions of the DMCA, one might argue
that other clauses of the Constitution allow Congress to enact these
provisions. The likely sources of Congressional power would be the
Commerce Clause' 5 3 and the Necessary and Proper Clause.' 5 4 As de-
scribed below, neither of these clauses grants Congress the power to
enact the anti-trafficking provisions of § 1201 (b).
The Commerce Clause does not give Congress the power to enact
legislation that contradicts another provision of the Constitution.155
In Railway Labor Executives' Association, the Court held that Congress
could not use the Commerce Clause to enact non-uniform bankruptcy
laws because the Bankruptcy Clause requires that bankruptcy laws be
uniform. 156 Because fair use is constitutionally required in order to
achieve the balance the Copyright Clause requires, and to promote
the useful arts and science, Railway LaborExecutives'Association dictates
that Congress cannot use the Commerce Clause to destroy this bal-
ance. -If Congress were allowed to use the Commerce Clause to elimi-
nate fair use, a constitutional limitation required by the Copyright
Clause would be bypassed. This bypassing of a constitutional limita-
153 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
154 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
155 See Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, 468-69 (1982).
156 See id.
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tion is precisely what the Court held to be impermissible in Railway
Labor Executives' Association.157
While other cases have held that Congress can use its Commerce
Clause power to enact legislation to give copyright-like protection to
works not within the scope of the Copyright Clause,15 8 these cases do
not allow Congress to usurp a constitutional limitation. In Moghadam,
the court upheld a statute' 59 that granted copyright-like protection to
live musical performances. 160 The court noted that the Copyright
Clause does not prohibit Congress from extending protection, similar
to copyright, to works outside the scope of the Copyright Clause.' 6'
However, unlike the anti-bootlegging statute at issue in Moghadam, the
anti-trafficking provisions of § 1201 (b) do directly conflict with the re-
quirements of the Copyright Clause. As described above, the right of
fair use is required by the Copyright Clause. 162 Allowing the anti-traf-
ficking provisions of the DMCA to stand would not fill a gap in the
Copyright Clause like Moghadam permits, but rather would eradicate a
limitation on Congress's power imposed by the Copyright Clause.
In Authors League of America, the court held that Congress could
use the Commerce Clause to deny copyright protection to some for-
eign-manufactured works. 163 However, denying copyright protection
is not akin to usurping a constitutional limitation on congressional
power. The Copyright Clause gives Congress the power to enact copy-
right legislation; 64 it does not mandate that the legislation be enacted
or be uniform. Therefore, when Congress decided to deny copyright
protection to certain works, it was not contradicting a constitutional
limitation. However, the anti-trafficking provision of § 1201(b) is di-
rectly contrary to a constitutional limitation; therefore, the provision
is invalid.
157 See id. ("Thus, if we were to hold that Congress had the power to enact
nonuniform bankruptcy laws pursuant to the Commerce Clause, we would eradicate
from the Constitution a limitation on the power of Congress to enact bankruptcy
laws.").
158 See, e.g., United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1280 (11th Cir. 1999)
(holding that Congress could use the Commerce Clause to provide protection to live
musical performances, even if the performances were not fixed in a tangible medium
of expression as required by the Constitution); Authors League of Am., Inc. v. Oman,
790 F.2d 220, 224 (2d Cir. 1986) (stating that Congress can use the Commerce Clause
to deny copyright protection to certain foreign-manufactured works).
159 18 U.S.C. § 2319A (1994).
160 175 F.3d at 1280.
161 Id.
162 See supra Part II.B.
163 790 F.2d at 224.
164 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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Likewise, the Necessary and Proper Clause cannot be used as a
basis for congressional power to enact the anti-trafficking provisions
of the DMCA. The Necessary and Proper Clause does grant Congress
wide latitude to implement laws to achieve the ends permitted by the
Constitution. 165 However, the Necessary and Proper Clause does not
allow Congress to transcend constitutional limits on its power.166 The
Court in McCulloch stated, "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within
the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate,
which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but con-
sistent with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional." 67
Congress's intent to protect copyrighted works from piracy is legiti-
mate and within the scope of the Constitution. However, the anti-
trafficking provisions of the DMCA are not "consistent with the letter
and spirit of the constitution," but rather abrogate the right of fair
use. As explained above, the Copyright Clause requires a fair use
right so that the arts and sciences can be promoted. The anti-traffick-
ing provisions of the DMCA effectively eliminate the right of fair use
and therefore cannot be justified under the Necessary and Proper
Clause.
IV. As A MATTER OF POLICY, A FAIR USE DEFENSE
SHOULD BE ADDED TO § 1201 (b)
The inability of a person to make fair use of a DVD is just the tip
of the iceberg. As e-commerce develops and more Internet users gain
access to high-speed connections such as cable modems and T1 lines,
more and more information can be expected to be distributed in en-
crypted digital format. While Congiess's intent of protecting digital
information and prohibiting interception and unauthorized access to
digital transmissions or private digital archives is noble, the DMCA
goes too far. The digital environment does pose a threat to copyright
owners because of the ability to easily, and at a very low cost, make
perfect copies of protected works. 168 However, beyond prohibiting ac-
165 See generally McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 413-14 (1819)
("To employ the means necessary to an end, is generally understood as employing any
means calculated to produce the end, and not as being confined to those single
means, without which the end would be entirely unattainable.").
166 See id. at 421.
167 Id. (emphasis added).
168 See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 309
(S.D.N.Y. 2000)..
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cess to digital transmissions, similar to scrambled satellite signals, 16 9 the
Reimerdes court's interpretation of the DMCA extends to all encrypted
digital information whether it exists in cyberspace or is in physical
form such as a DVD. Prohibiting circumvention of copy-control mea-
sures, particularly of digital information in a physical medium (such
as a DVD), is a dangerous expansion of the rights of a copyright
owner.
While the owner's economic interest is protected by this provi-
sion, society suffers because the lack of fair use will hinder the devel-
opment of, rather than promote, the arts and science. The
Constitution grants authors a limited monopoly, but at a cost. In ex-
change for the author's exclusive rights enumerated in § 106,170 the
public is entitled to make fair use of the work. The Framers of the
Constitution ingeniously created this trade-off to provide economic
incentive for original works while at the same time providing others
with a means to develop ideas and expand our country's wealth of
creative works. As Justice Story said:
In truth, in literature, in science and in art, there are, and can be,
few, if any, things, which, in an abstract sense, are strictly new and
original throughout. Every book in literature, science and art, bor-
rows, and must necessarily borrow, and use much which was well
known and used before.' 7
The anti-trafficking provisions of the DMCA prevent an average citi-
zen, not able to circumvent a technological protection measure him-
self, from making fair use of a work, thereby prohibiting the
borrowing that is necessary for future creation.
For example, while a person can still watch a movie on a DVD
and possibly be stimulated to create his own work, a person like Ben
from the above example is not able to study the movie in detail by
making a compilation of excerpts. Surely, there are creative geniuses
out there capable of being inspired to create great works with just the
least bit of studying or education. However, for a great deal of others,
fair use is required to foster creativity and aid the development of lit-
erary and artistic works. The DMCA denies these people the stimula-
tion they need in order to promote the useful arts and sciences.
The desire to prohibit trafficking of circumvention technologies
is understandable. The prohibition makes it much easier to protect
169 It is argued above that this is the type of material Congress intended to protect
with the DMCA. See supra notes 56-67 and accompanying text; see also H.R. REP. No.
105-551, pt. 1, at 10 (1998) (analogy to satellite transmissions).
170 See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994).
171 Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4436).
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works from infringement, as potential infringers will not have access
to the tools necessary to commit the crime. The court in Reimerdes
analogized the prohibition on trafficking of circumvention technolo-
gies to the prohibition on the possession of burglar tools. 172 However,
unlike circumvention technologies, which allow lawful fair use, bur-
glar tools by definition are useful only in committing crimes. What
the anti-trafficking provisions do is more analogous to banning the
sale of alcohol to the entire population in order to reduce the amount
of drunk driving and is therefore overbroad.
Most people would agree that, like copyright infringement,
drunk driving is a problem. Most would further agree that banning
the sale of alcohol would greatly reduce the incidence of drunk driv-
ing and promote the important government interest of keeping
streets safe much more efficiently than arresting drunk drivers with
officers on random patrol or at road blocks. However, most would
disagree that a ban on the sale of alcohol is the answer to the prob-
lem. Like circumvention technologies, there are lawful uses of alco-
hol, and while the sale of alcohol may lead to an increase in crime,
this is a cost of living in a free society. Likewise, the trafficking ban on
circumvention technologies is a much more efficient way of protect-
ing copyrights than going after infringers directly; however, it frus-
trates the constitutional purpose of promoting the useful arts and
sciences by not allowing fair use. A fair use exception to the anti-
trafficking provisions would solve this problem.
So what should be done? As noted above, the court in Reimerdes
erroneously looked at DeCSS as a technology to circumvent access-
control measures, 73 and chose to accept the fact that strict enforce-
ment of the DMCA would deprive many people of their right to fair
use:
Many of the possible fair uses may be made without circumventing
CSS while others, i.e., those requiring copying, may not. Hence, the
question whether § 1201(a) (2) as applied here substantially affects
rights, much less constitutionally protected rights, of members of
the "fair use community" cannot be decided in bloc, without consid-
eration of the circumstances of each member or similarly situated
groups of members. Thus, the prudential concern with ensuring
that constitutional questions be decided only when the facts before
the Court so require counsels against permitting defendants to
mount an overbreadth challenge here.174
172 See 111 F. Supp. 2d at 329.
173 See supra Part I.
174 Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 338.
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Thus, the court in Reimerdes punted on the constitutional issue. Other
courts are free to and should decide this important issue. As argued
above, the fair use doctrine is derived from the Constitution's purpose
of promoting the useful arts and sciences. 175 Courts thus have two
options. They can either declare the anti-trafficking provisions un-
constitutional, or they can develop a new common-law fair use excep-
tion to the anti-trafficking provisions. Of course, Congress can step in
at any time and draft a fair use exception to the anti-trafficking provi-
sions that withstands constitutional scrutiny.
Congressional action is preferable in order to publicly discuss the
issue and to impose a uniform standard across the country. However,
until Congress chooses to act, the latter option is preferable. Just as
courts had done for all versions of the copyright act prior to the cur-
rent Copyright Act of 1976, courts should now imply a fair use excep-
tion to the anti-trafficking provisions. By doing this, the DMCA's
policy goals of protecting copyrighted works against the increased
threats in the digital age will be preserved while the constitutional
purpose of promoting the development of arts and sciences will also
be protected. The standards for applying fair use to the anti-traffick-
ing provisions must be carefully tailored in order to effectively protect
copyrights.
The fair use exception to the anti-trafficking provisions should
balance the desire to protect the effectiveness and integrity of copy-
control technologies with the interests of those who would like to
make fair use. Congress would be the best place to have this balance
worked out. One possible example, not intended to be the only possi-
bility, of a fair use exception may help illustrate what Congress may
choose to do. 176
Courts could simply say that people may traffic in technologies to
circumvent copy-control measures in order to allow another to make a
lawful use of the protected work. Courts could apply a negligence
standard to the fair use exception such that if a person negligently
provides an infringer with a circumvention technology, the supplier of
the circumvention technology would be liable under the provisions of
the DMCA.177 While exact contours of the negligence standard would
have to be refined by the courts, presumably a site such as 2600.com,
175 See supra Part II.B.
176 Finding a solution to this problem is a difficult task and the more ideas that are
presented, the better the discussion will be, which will hopefully lead to the best possi-
ble solution.
177 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 1203-1204 (Supp. V 1999) (discussing civil and criminal pen-
alties respectively).
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which indiscriminately offers DeCSS for download, 178 would be acting
negligently by not even attempting to verify if the intended use of the
circumvention technology is lawful. This is similar to the exception
for reverse engineering 179 but would allow trafficking solely for fair
use purposes rather than for interoperability purposes. The amount
of verification necessary to ensure that the recipient of the circumven-
tion technology intends to make fair use would be no greater than the
amount needed for the reverse engineering exception. 80 People in-
tending to offer circumvention technologies would have to verify that
the potential user intends to make a lawful use of the circumvention
technology. This would place a fairly large burden on the distributor,
but that is not necessarily a bad thing. It can be assumed that many
people would think that the burden and accompanying risk of distrib-
uting circumvention technologies is too large, and they would not of-
fer technologies. At the same time, however, other groups would
most likely be willing to verify a user's intended purpose. 181 Also, a
person such as Ben in the above example would be able to have his
friend Jack develop a circumvention technology for him to use.
This scheme seems to strike a fairly good balance. Many people
would be deterred from trafficking in circumvention technologies,
which would protect the economic incentive to produce creative
works. At the same time, those people who continue to offer circum-
vention technologies, whether it be a web site or a friend of the "fair
user," would have to verify that the user intends to make a fair use.
This possible solution fulfills the constitutional requirement of pro-
moting the useful arts and sciences while still holding traffickers liable
for negligently aiding the infringement of copyright.
CONCLUSION: WHAT'S NEXT?
In conclusion, 8 2 CSS should be treated as a copy-control mea-
sure, not an access-control measure. While the provision of the
178 See Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 309.
179 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(f).
180 See id. § 1201(f) (3).
181 It is a fear that no one would be willing to distribute circumvention technolo-
gies for fear of liability. However, as courts begin to develop the contours of the
negligence standard and things become more certain, more people would probably
be willing to verify a user's intended purpose. If no one would be willing to provide
circumvention technologies to users who wish to make fair use, courts would have to
consider other alternatives.
182 Another issue, beyond the scope of this Note, may play an important role in
the distribution of DeCSS. There are concerns that the prohibition on trafficking of
DeCSS is a violation of the First Amendment. See Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 326-33.
2002]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
DMCA that prohibits the trafficking of technologies to circumvent ac-
cess-control measures is a more effective and efficient means of pro-
tecting the rights of a copyright holder than directly attacking
infringers, it frustrates the Constitution's purpose and eliminates
users' rights to make fair use of the protected works. Ideally, Congress
will step in and legislate a fair use exception to the anti-trafficking
provisions as it did in 1976, when it codified the common-law fair use
doctrine. However, if Congress chooses not to act, courts should ei-
ther rule that the DMCA is unconstitutional because it does not pro-
mote the useful arts and science, or courts should read in a fair use
exception to comport with the Copyright Clause's purpose.
A couple of recent cases have held that certain computer code is protected speech.
See generallyJunger v. Daley, 209 F.3d 481, 485 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that the First
Amendment protects encryption source code); Bernstein v. U.S. Dep't ofJustice, 176
F.3d 1132, 1141 (9th Cir. 1999) ("[E]ncrvption software, in its source code form and
as employed by those in the field of cryptography, must be viewed as expressive for
First Amendment purposes.") (citation omitted). An argument can be made that the
DMCA's restriction on the dissemination of DeCSS is an impermissible restraint on
freedom of expression. Whether this argument is persuasive or not is outside the
scope of this Note. It is mentioned merely to illustrate that there are other possible
arguments to justify the distribution of DeCSS. For a recent case analyzing the First
Amendment implications of posting DeCSS, see DVD Copy Control Ass'n v. Bunner, No.
CV786804, 2001 WL 1340619, at *11 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 1, 2001) (finding that the
trial court's grant of a preliminary injunction, prohibiting the defendants from link-
ing to sites that distribute DeCSS, was an unconstitutional prior restraint on the de-
fendants' First Amendment rights).
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